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EVIDENCE
By ELI M. SPARK*
More Georgia appellate court decisions were rendered on points of
evidence during the period under consideration than on any other single
subject, -with the exception only of civil practice and procedure and
criminal law and procedure. As problems of evidence arise in matters
relating to all fields of law, this is quite understandable. An effort will be
made to classify and review these decisions and to comment on some of
them or to point out their significance. Although there has been no revolutionary departure from established doctrines and principles, we may find
significance in the mode and scope of their application to specific fact situations, and indications as to future applications and trends. In any event,
by recounting the decisions of the period we may review generally, out of
the current work of our courts, many principles of the law of evidence.
PRESUMPTIONS

In Todd v. State' the Supreme Court held that when nothing to the contrary is made to appear, the law will presume that a public officer properly permormed his duty, but that when the fact is expressly challenged and
undisputed evidence introduced which shows the duty was not performed,
such presumption will no longer stand. The possession of property recently stolen, not explained to the jury's satisfaction, was held sufficient, in Vining v. State,' to authorize the jury to infer that the accused was guilty of
its theft.
Carrollv. Hill' involved an application by a widow for a year's support,
where the caveators alleged the invalidity of a ceremonial marriage between the widow and the decedent because of prior marriages of the widow. The Court of Appeals held that as between the presumption of continuance of the widow's earlier marriages and that of the validity of her
later ceremonial marriage to the decedent, the latter presumption will
prevail, subject to the caveators' burden of proof.
The presumption of sanity was involved in Jones v. Smith.4 The court
held that the law presumes every man to be sane until there is evidence
to the contrary, and that proof of a temporary lapse of sanity at a previous time creates no presumption that it continued up to the time of execution of the contract in issue.
The rebuttable statutory presumption' that a claim or charge is wellfounded when a party has evidence in his power and within his reach by
which he may repel a claim or charge against him and omits to produce

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

*Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; A.B., 1926;
College of City of New York; LL.B., 1929, Fordham University; Member New York
Bar and Georgia Bar Association.
205 Ga. 363, 53 S.E.2d 906 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 756, 57 S.E.2d 354 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 576, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949).
206 Ga. 162, 56 S.E.2d 462 (1949).
GA. CODE § 38-119 (1933).
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it, or having more certain and satisfactory evidence in his power relies
on that which is of a weaker and inferior nature, was considered in Fields
v. Yellow Cab Co.6 It was held to apply to either party to an action, and
to be intended to penalize either party. It was therefore not error for the
trial court to refuse to charge the statutory presumption when the -record showed that the unproduced witnesses could have been produced
equallT by either party. One credible witness, however, said the court, will
ordinarily be deemed sufficient to establish a fact, so that it is not necessary
to produce all the witnesses having knowledge of a transaction in order to
oiercome the statutory presumption.
Where the caption of a deed named a state and county but the description in the body of the deed omitted them, the Supreme Court held, in
7 that it will be presumed that the grantor intended
Copeland v. Carpenter,
to convey land located in that state and county. This is rather a holding
as to the proper interpretation of the instrument than as to any technical
"presumption."
The ancient presumption that the citizens of a state are cognizant of
its laws was reiterated in Grady County v. Banker,' where, strangely
enough, it was argued (unsuccessfully) that the reading of an applicable
statute to the jury by the court in the course of its charge created prejudice
and was therefore erroneous.
The presumption of the innocence of a defendant in a criminal case was
reiterated in Owens v. State.' The indictment and plea of not guilty are
not evidence, said the Court of Appeals, but merely frame the issues for
the jury's consideration; and the defendant's plea brings him into the
court with the presumption of innocence, which remains until the State
proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury's satisfaction.
In Independent Life and Acident Company v. Hopkins'" a man had been
stabbed and killed with a hack cutter (a sort of three-cornered file). In
a suit upon the accident clause of his life insurance policy, the insurance
company claimed that the death came within the policy exception for death
resulting from any person's intentional acts. The Court of Appeals held
that where one uses a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to cause death,
and death results, it will be conclusively presumed that such was the party's
intention, because of the rule of circumstantial evidence that one intends
the natural and proximate results of his acts; but that no such presumption
arises from the use of an instrument which, though capable of being used
as a deadly weapon, is not naturally and ordinarily considered to be one.
Carrigan v. State" was a murder prosecution, and the problem was the
proof of malice, or intent to kill. The Supreme Court, in affirming the defendant's conviction, stated that when one shoots at another with a pistol
and hits that other, the law presumes prima facie that he did it with malice;
such presumption is not rebutted by proof that the parties had been good
friends, or that the defendant immediately thereafter regretted the act.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

80 Ga. App. 569, 56 S.E.2d 845 (1949).
206 Ga. 822, 59 S.E.2d 245 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 701, 59 S.E.2d 732 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 182, 58 S.E.2d 550 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 348, 56 S.E.2d 177 (1949).
206 Ga. 707, 58 S.E.2d 407 (1950).
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Pointing a gun at another, loaded or unloaded, in fun or otherwise, except
when allowed by Code Section 26-5 107, is unlawful; if the gun is accidentally discharged during such unlawful act, the person is guilty at least of involuntary manslaughter. A belief that the gun was not loaded makes no
difference; the act being one which would naturally tend to kill, if death
results from doing so intentionally and recklessly murder has been committed, for the reckless disregard of human life is equivalent to a specific
intent to kill.
A criminal intent was presumed also in Balark v. State.'2 In a prosecution
for fishing with nets in forbidden waters, where the evidence showed that
three of the four defendants were operating their boats within such forbidden waters with nets in fishing position, the Court of Appeals held that
the jury was authorized thereby to find that they intended to commit a
particular act, namely to fish there, and that the State need not further
show that they intended to violate the law.
JUDICIAL NOTICE

In McDade v. lW/est' 3 it was held that the procedure by which painters
ascend smokestacks in order to paint them, using them in effect as ladders,
in the manner alleged, was not a matter of common knowledge, of which
the court could take judicial notice. The case is also interesting on a point
of tort law, the whole Court of Appeals being equally divided on whether a
wife has a cause of action for loss of her husband's consortium as a result
of injuries suffered by him.
In a bastardy proceeding, Steed v. State, 4 it was held that the court will
take judicial notice of what medical science has determined to be normal
periods of gestation, and will consult medical books for that purpose.
An interesting question regarding the proof of law of another state was
involved in Carter v. Graves.'5 The court ruled that the party seeking to rely on such foreign law must put it in evidence, or present it in a manner
authorizing the court to take judicial notice thereof, under Code Section
38-II 2. This required it to be in a form "published by authority"; the Pacific Reporter, published by West Publishing Company, although highly
regarded by the court, was field not to be so published, "so as to authorize
the trial court to take judicial cognizance" of a California decision read
therefrom.
It has been pointed out that the Georgia Supreme Court in reality treats
the "published by authority" requirement as a condition of receiving in
evidence proof of the foreign law, but actually refuses true judicial notice
thereof, which would mean dispensing with any necessity for proof.1 Code
Section 38-i 12 uses the language, "shall be judicially recognized without
the introduction of proof," but the "published by authority" requirement
drastically limits its scope. To achieve true judicial notice of foreign law,
the Uniform Act on Judicial Notice of Foreign Law should be adopted,
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

81 Ga. App. 649, 59 S.E.2d 524 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 732 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 360, 56 S.E.2d 171 (1949).
206 Ga. 234, 56 S.E.2d 917 (1949).
See Agnor, JudicialNotice of The Law of Another State, 12 GA. B.J. 379 (1950).
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as recommended by the American Bar Association over a decade ago." Incidentally, Code Section 38-1 12, with the same "published by authority" requirement, applies also (and even) to "all laws and resolutions of the
[Georgia] General Assembly and the journals of each branch thereof."
In Campbell v. Powell'8 the Supreme Court expressly stated:
"When the statutes of a sister State are relied upon as in this case, they
must be pleaded and proven just as any other essential fact of which the
court cannot take judicial notice. Bolton v. Georgia Pacific Railway Co., 83 Ga.
659, (10 S.E. 352) ; Cummings v. Montague, 116 Ga. 457, (42 S.E. 732); Savannah, Co. v. Evans, 121 Ga. 391 (49 S.E. 308).""3

The parties in the Campbell case had agreed that the controversy should
be determined by the court according to the statutes of New York as they
had been construed by the courts of that state. They accordingly "waived
the necessity of pleading and proving the New York statutes relied upon,
and consequently the record" was "silent respecting the New York law relied upon by the parties in support of their respective contentions." It was
a non-jury case. The Supreme Court said:
" .. . in the absence as here, of anything in the record to the contrary, we
will presume that the trial judge has-carefully examined the applicable
laws
20
of that State and correctly decided the questions presented to him.

It is odd that the Supreme Court took the view that before it the record
was silent respecting the New York law, and contained nothing to contradict the trial judge's finding thereon. It would seem clear that, if the
waiver stipulation of the parties was effective, the material demonstrating
the New York law, presumably examined by the trial judge, should be considered a part of the record before the Supreme Court as well as before
the trial court, and that the Supreme Court was in a position to review
the correctness of the trial court's ruling thereon. Supplementing even such
stipulation, the attorneys should properly submit to the court, for its assistance, the material demonstrating their respective views of the New
York law. In any case, such a stipulation regarding foreign law may evidently have untoward consequences, such as the failure here of the right of
review thereon; it must be carefully and explicitly drawn, and the materials showing the foreign law should be expressly laid on the record, in
the present state of Georgia law.
Copeland v. Ca'penter2' held that the Supreme Court would take judicial
notice of official records, on file in the office of the Secretary of State,
relating to the designation of realty by lot and district. White v. Spahr"
held that a court will take judicial notice of the fact that enumerated land
lots in a specified land district of a named county are square in shape and
contain 25o acres each, and that a certain lot is south of another designated
2 3 it was held
lot. In Thigpen v. Town of Davidsboro
that a court could take
judicial notice that a town was incorporated.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2573 (3d ed. 1940).

206 Ga. 768, 58 S.E.2d 829 (1950).
Id. at 769, 58 S.E.2d at 830.
Id. at 770, 58 S.E.2d at 830.
2C6 Ga. 822, 59 S.E.2d 245 (1950).
207 Ga. 10, 59 S.E.2d 916 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 610, 59 S.E.2d 522 (1950).
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Sta'te24

presented the interesting case of the wife of an acThomas v.
cused in a criminal proceeding being offered as a witness on the defendant's behalf, but merely to establish certain facts necessary on a motion
for a continuance, and not the defendant's guilt or innocence. Her testimony
was offered to show tha.t she had subpoenaed a necessary witness who had
not appeared. The statutory incompetency of the spouse, or for that matter of the accused himself, was properly held to be limited to the accused's
guilt or innocence, and not to apply to such a collateral subject. 5
One of the well-established exceptions to the rule of the spouse's incompetency is where the crime charged is a crime upon the person of the
spouse. "So in JJilliams v. State,26 in which the husband was being prosecuted as a principal in the second degree to a rape of his wife, testimony of
the wife as to statements which the husband made to her, and as to acts and
conduct of the husband toward her prior to the commission of the rape, was
properly held material and admissible.
The "dead man statute" was involved in several cases. Jones v. Smith"
was a suit to cancel an option to purchase realty which had been given by
the plaintiff's deceased father. It was contended that the father was mentally incompetent when he executed the option. Code Section 38-16o3 ()
did not, said the Supreme Court, render the plaintiff incompetent to give
an opinion, based on associations with and opportunities to observe the
decedent in his home and presence, that the decedent was out of his mind
when he executed the option; this was not testifying to a transaction or
communication with the decedent as contemplated by the statute. Four cases
were cited as authority for this holding.s The same case also held that an
attorney who witnesses a contract as a subscribing witness, and who was
employed to prepare it, is competent to testify concerning the maker's
mental condition if in issue, and also as to facts showing the maker's knowledge or ignorance of the contents of the paper, and as to all other pertinent facts attending the signing and attestation of the instrument despite
Code Sections 38-418 (2) and 38-419. In Smith v. Smith,29 a trespass action,
where the defendants held title to realty adjoining the plaintiff's as heirs
at law, and were being sued by the plaintiff as individuals and not as representatives of an estate, and no relief was claimed against the estate, the
plaintiff was held competent to testify in his own behalf as to a conversation which he had had with the deceased predecessor in title of defendants.
ADMISSIBILITY

State3"

stated the established rule that it is the province of the
Brock v.
judge in all instances to determine the admissibility of evidence, and applied
81 Ga. App. 59, 58 S.E.2d 213 (1950).
Citing GA. CODE §§ 38-416, 38-1604 (1933).
206 Ga. 107, 55 S.E.2d 589 (1949).
206 Ga. 162, 56 S.E.2d 462 (1949).
Cato v. Hunt, 112 Ga. 139, 37 S.E. 183 (1900) ; Arnold v. Freeman, 181 Ga. 654,
183 S.E. 811 (1936); Meyers v. Phillips, 197 Ga. 536, 29 S.E.2d 700 (1944)
Watkins v. Stulb and Vorbauer, 23 Ga. App. 181, 98 S.E. 94 (1919).
29. 206 Ga. 461, 57 S.E.2d 611 (1950).
30. 206 Ga. 397, 57 S.E.2d 279 (1950).

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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it when sufficient preliminary facts had been shown to authorize the admission of a non-expert's opinion testimony that a party was not sane. Another established doctrine was restated in City of Pearson v. Glidden Co.,3
namely, that not every exclusion of testimony will be reversible error, but
that it must appear that the excluded testimony was material, and would
have benefited the complaining party.
Carroll v. Hill,32 however, stated a doctrine which the writer submits is
quite unsound. It holds, in so many words, that in cases of doubt as to the
admissibliity of evidence, the current of authority in this state is to admit
it, and to leave its weight and effect to be determined by the jury. Surely this
is an abdication by the court of probably its most essential function in the
conduct of a trial. The jury, uninstructed in the considerations which underlie our rules of evidence, ought not to consider evidence which creates
serious doubt in the trained mind of the judge as to its propriety. To allow
it for the jury's consideration is, in practical result, to rule that it is admissible, and not of doubtful admissibility. A court's uncertainty as to the
proper application of rules of evidence should not ipso facto result in admissibility. On the other hand, if the evidence falls into that substantial
category of matters where the court's informed and experienced discretion
should determine the admissibility, the doctrine enunciated by this case
would result in reality in the jury's discretion being applied. That 33such a
doctrine should be found in the cases is unfortunate, to say the least.
It may be observed that the Carroll case cites as authority Gilmer v.
Atlanta, Andrews v. State35 and Mayor, etc. v. Franklin." The Andrews
and Franklin cases do not so hold. While the Gilmer case uses the same
language as the Carroll case in stating what purports to be a rule, it was a
reversal because the trial court had refused to admit evidence, in an action
against a city for personal injuries resulting from tripping over the exposed roots of a tree, that another person had tripped over the roots a few
days before the plaintiff did so. Does not the Gilmer case then really hold
that the evidence of the similar accident, only a few days before, with the
conditions substantially the same, should have been admitted as evidence
of the existence of a dangerous condition, and perhaps of notice thereof
to the defendant, rather than that its admissibility was doubtful? Franklin
v. Mayor, 7 incidentally, contains an interesting criticism by Judge Lumpkin
which continues applicable in our own day. As early as I852, of the captious objections which many trial lawyers habitually make, he says:
"I have long been satisfied that we are hide-bound and restricted in our practice, with regard to the admissibility of evidence. The books of Reports will
show that there is no State in the Union, and no country in the world, where
31. 205 Ga. 738, 55 S.E.2d 125 (1949).
32. 80 Ga. App. 576, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949).
33. It is expressed also in a dictum in the special concurring opinion in Landers v
Davis, 80 Ga. App. 766, 769, 57 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1950) thus: "Indeed it is the rule
in this State that, if the admissibility of evidence is doubtful, it should be admitted."
34. 77 Ga. 688 (1-a) (1886).
35. 118 Ga. 1, 43 S.E. 852 (1903).
26. 12 Ga. 239 [sic], 261 (1852). Presumably the case intended is the next case in the
same volume of reports, involving the same parties, and collateral to the one actually cited, namely Franklinv. Mayor, 12 Ga. 257, 261 (1852).
37. 206 Ga. 397, 57 S.E.2d 279 (1950).
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there are as many raptious objections made to testimony. It is high time that
the pradtice should be discouraged.
. . Nothing tends more to embarrass a trial, civil or criminal, than the
frequent and frivolods objections
that are so commonly and capriciously made
to the introduction of the proof. ' 38
HEARSAY

A number of cases involved the hearsay rule. In Lankfor v. Pope,39
the Supreme Court stated that the boundaries of a tract, which had been
held to be provable by extrinsic evidence, might be proved by hearsay, its
weight to be determined by the jury according to the source from which it
comes.4" In Waller v. State4' it was held that a photostatic copy of a police
radio log giving the defendant's name, license tag number and description
of his car, made of a broadcast while the police were actually chasing him
for traffic violations, could not be excluded as hearsay where the same facts
had already been testified to and admitted without objection. In McClung
v. State," which was a murder prosecution, it was held that when, in a legal
investigation, information and similar evidence are offered as facts to explain the defendant's conduct and ascertain his motives, they may be admitted in evidence-not as hearsay but as original evidence.
. Fowler v. Latham" (appearing in the Supreme Court for the fifth time)
was a suit to recover land which the plaintiffs claimed under an unrecorded
deed thereof to their now deceased father for life, with remainder to them.
The Supreme Court held admissible, as a "declaration against interest" a
statement made by the deceased father to a stranger witness, ante litem
motam, that he had forged the deed." This would appear clearly admissible against the plaintiffs even if the declarant had remained alive, as an
"admission" by a former owner respecting his title. In Smith v. Smith,"'
however, the declarations of one since deceased as to where the boundary
line to disputed lands was located had been wholly in favor of the declarant and not part of the res gestae; it was therefore held mere hearsay and
not admissible in a trespass action.
In Minor v. Fincher" a surveyor, whose testimony was being relied on
to establish the boundary lines of land claimed by the plaintiff, testified that
his survey had been based on information given him by a person not testifying and whose source of knowledge was not proved. The surveyor's testimony was therefore held hearsay, without probative value, and not competent evidence on which to base a finding as to the amount of timber allegedly wrongfully cut and removed from the plaintiff's land. While boundaries may be proved by traditionary reputation in the neighborhood derived from ancient sources, said the Supreme Court, or from declarations
of persons since deceased who had peculiar means of knowing the reputa38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

12 Ga. 257, 261 (1852).
206 Ga. 430, 57 S.E.2d 538 (1950).
Citing GA. CODE § 38-313 (1933).
80 Ga. App. 488, 56 S.E.2d 491 (1949).
206 Ga. 421, 57 S.E.2d 559 (1950).
206 Ga. 245, 56 S.E.2d 272 (1950).
Citing GA. CODE § 38-309 (1933).
206 Ga. 461, 57 S.E.2d 611 (1950).
206 Ga. 721, 58 S.E.2d 389 (1950).
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tion as to boundary of the land in an ancient day, present-day reputation
is not admissible.
In Rymer v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp.7 an action was brought for
the loss of an automobile, and the insured defended on the ground that the
plaintiff had no insurable interest therein because he had acquired the automobile not from its true owner but from thieves. Testimony was admitted
by the confessed thief that he had enlisted two confederates to help dispose
of the automobile, and that the confederates had told him that the house
to which the automobile was taken by them was the plaintiff's house. This
was clearly hearsay, and its admission was held reversible error.
An interesting confusion and misconception as to the term "hearsay"
is found in Dawdle v. West Lumber Co., 8 where it was contended that
testimony as to a telephone conversation in which one party called the
number listed for the other in the telephone book, and spoke with her on
matters material to the issues, should be excluded as hearsay. Obviously,
the problem was one of identification or authenticity, and not of hearsay.
The Court of Appeals held evidence of the telephone conversation admissible, as there was both direct and circumstantial evidence of the party's
identity.
REs GESTAE
Several cases were decided which involved the res gestae doctrine.
In Thornton v. King,49 where there was evidence that a truck driver was
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his collision with
the plaintiff's parked automobile, statements by the driver, made spontaneously and immediately on the occurrence, that his employer would pay for
the damages were held admissible as part of the res gestae, to shed light
on whose negligence was responsible for the collision. ilgood v. Daltoin
Brick & Tile Corp." was a similar action for injuries caused by the negligence of the individual defendant while driving a truck allegedly within
the scope of his employment by the corporate defendant. Here, statements
made by the individual defendant that the corporate defendant owned the
truck and that he worked for the corporate defendant were held properly
excluded as hearsay when offered in evidence by the testimony of those
to whom made, without showing the authority of the individual defendant to make such admission against the corporate defendant, and when
such statements were made too late to be part of the res gestae. These
statements included a statement made to a highway patrolman in an investigation fifteen or twenty minutes after the collision, a statement made to the
plaintiff's wife when the individual defendant came to visit the plaintiff at
a hospital after the collision, and a statement made to the plaintiff's mother-in-law while they were riding home in a taxicab after having been at the
hospital to see the plaintiff after the collision.
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Jones5' re-enunciated the requirements of
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

81
79
81
81
80

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

App.
App.
App.
App.
App.

308, 58
663,'54
122, 58
189, 58
472, 56

S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d

471
682
227
522
305

(1950).
(1949).
(1950).
(1950).
(1949).
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the res gestae doctrine, holding that statements must be contemporaneous
with the main fact but need not be preci'sely concurrent, must spring out
of the transaction, elucidate it, be voluntary and be made at such time as
reasonably to exclude design or afterthought. The action was one on the.
double indemnity provision of a life insurance policy. The beneficiary testified that the insured, his step-mother, told him a few minutes after a fall
that her hand had slipped off the table and she fell; this was held admissible.
In Waller v. State52 the photostatic copy of the radio log- of the police.
broadcast made during the chase was held admissible as part of the res gestae. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Gottlieb53 was an action on an employee's
fidelity bond. It was held that the employee's extrajudicial admission that
he had stolen beer bottles five days earlier and also one day earlier was
not admissible as part of the resgestae to establish the larceny. The court
stated that the admission of a -principal could be received as evidence in
an action against his surety only if made during the transaction of the business for which the surety was bound, so as to becotie a part of the res
gastae, but not otherwise.
OPINION-CONCLUSIONS

Where the plaintiff saw a collision between the defendant's truck and
his own parked car, it was held in Thornton v. King54 that the admission
of the plaintiff's testimony as to the speed of the truck was not error; even
though he testified that he could not swear how fast it was going but only
how fast he thought it was going. The subject matter was, of course, a
proper one for the giving of an experienced layman's opinion; the form
of the witness's language did not materially detract from the substance of
his testimony. Lockridge-Rogers Lumber Co. v. Lord" was an action for
the purchase price of a rip saw and starter, in which the defendant claimed
a breach of a warranty that the machine would rip lumber up to 4 inches
thick. The opinion evidence of one of the plaintiffs, based on actual experience with such saws over many years, that it would rip lumber up to 4
inches in thickness, was, as against the defendant's evidence that it failed to
do so, held sufficient to create a conflict in the evidence and to authorize the
court's finding in the plaintiff's favor.
A non-expert's opinion as to the sanity of a defendant in a murder prosecution was involved in Brock v. State."6 It was held that when facts are
shown prima facie sufficient to authorize the introduction of opinion evidence of a non-expert as to mental condition, such opinion evidence may
be introduced, and it is then the jury's province to determine whether the
facts on which the opinion was based were sufficient to authorize the opinion, and hence what weight the jury will give to it. Where non-expert witnesses testified that they knew the defendant, had been in his presence,
had observed his conduct, and that their opinion based on such facts would
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

80 Ga. App.
80 Ga. App.
81 Ga. App.
80 Ga. App.
206 Ga. 397,

488, 56 S.E.2d 491 (1949). See also at p. 94 supra, under HEARSAY.
634, 56 S.E.2d 799 (1949).
122, 58 S.E.2d 227 (1950).
37, 54 S.E.2d 914 (1949).
57 S.E.2d 279 (1950).
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be that he was insane, the Supreme Court held it error not to permit them
to testify.
In Parsons v. Foshee57 the plaintiff in an automobile collision case was
allowed to testify that he saw the defendant's car turning across the highway and that she was going to completely block his side of the highway,
even though this latter was perhaps a conclusion, according to the court.
There having been other testimony as to the facts of the occurrence immediately preceding this testimony, and in view of the plaintiff's right to
explain to the jury what fact or thing motivated his actions, its admission
was held. proper. In effect the plaintiff was giving a layman's "shorthand
statement" of what he observed, though in an artless, conclusory form,
rather than describing the operation of his mind. And, :n Haynes v. State, 8
a witness's statement that he "knew" the defendant was selling liquor,
based on the witness's actual knowledge of such fact, was held not objectionable as a mere conclusion, where no attempt was made on crossexamination to show that the statement was in fact a conclusion, rather
than such layman's "shorthand statement" of facts to which he could testify, and which were meant by the witness to be deemed incorporated in
and conveyed by the form of expression which he chose.
5 9 asking
In Coleman v. Garrison
the plaintiff whether property owned
by him and his wife was within four straight lines on a sketch of a plat
shown him was held not to be improper as calling for a conclusion and as
not the best available proof of ownership. The surveyor who made the plat
in this case testified that it was a correct representation of the land described in the deed, the plat and deed were introduced in evidence, and
the plaintiff gave other testimony connecting his ownership with the plat. In
Jones v. Smith" a general opinion held by a family that a certain option
would never be exercised was properly held inadmissible as purely a conclusion.
VALUE

Proof of value of property was also involved in Jones v. Smith.' Such
value cannot be established by proof that the owner or agent was offered,
or was willing to take, a certain price for it at a time and on an occasion entirely disassociated from the transaction under consideration. The exclusion
of evidence as to what the owner would be willing to take for it was likewise held not in error.
In a trover action for the value of an automobile, Bedgood v. Karp's
U-Drive-It Co., 62the highest proved value between the time of the conversion and the trial was held to be for the jury if the evidence is in conflict.
A verdict for $1,125 was held proper where the plaintiff's witnesses showed
a value up to $1,400, and the defendant's witnesses testified that it was
worth considerably less.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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ADMISSIONS

In Aiken v. Richardson3 the court had occasion to re-assert the established doctrine that admissions made in pleadings which are thereafter
withdrawn and amended cannot be considered in ruling on demurrers to
the pleading as it is finally amended. This, of course, in no way detracts
from the right to make appropriate use of such admissions in the course
of a trial, as, for example, upon the cross-examination of the party.
In Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Gottlieb64 the extra-judicial admission
by an employee that he had stolen beer bottles from his employer five days
and also one day earlier was not only held inadmissible as part of the res
gestae to establish the larceny, but inadmissible also as an admission against
interest by a stranger to the suit bearing on a collateral issue essential to
the adjudication," since it bore directly on the main issue.
An admission by silence in a criminal case was involved in Phillips v.
6 The
State."
prosecution was for murder. A written statement made by one
jointly indicted with the defendant but separately tried, containing incriminating admissions that the actual shooting was done by the defendant on
trial, coupled with testimony of police officers that said statement was read
aloud both to the one who made it and the defendant on trial, and the latter made no denial thereof, was held properly admitted into evidence.
In Mincey v. Anderson67 the plaintiff-executrix was seeking to establish
constructive adverse possession of land in her deceased husband. Her testimony that, when trying to buy the land from the defendant, who claimed it
(before she or her husband had acquired a deed thereto from another
source) she did not claim any interest in it, nor did anyone whom she claimed under, constituted an admission against interest on the question of the
good faith of her possession. This admission, together with evidence that
the defendant paid the tax on the lot in dispute each year after the plaintiff's husband acquired his deed, rather indicated adverse possession by
the defendant, said the court, and made a jury question, so that the direction of a plaintiff's verdict was error.
CONFESSIONS

The technical distinction between a "confession" and an "admission"
was emphasized in Johns v. State." A confession, said the Court of Appeals, is an admission of the main fact in a charge of crime without any
exculpatory explanation. An admission, as applied to a criminal case, is a
statement by the defendant of a fact pertinent to the issue and tending,
in connection with other facts and circumstances, to prove the guilt of
the defendant, but not containing all the essential elements of the crime.
When the defendant in a criminal case made what was only an admission,
it was held that the trial court properly refused to give a requested charge
on the law of confessions.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

80 Ga. App. 591, 56 S.E.2d 782 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 643, 56 S.E.2d 799 (1949). See also at p. 96 supra under RES GESTAE.
Under GA. CODE § 38-405(2) (1933).
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The established rule that a conviction may be lawfully had on a free and
voluntary confession not corroborated otherwise than by proof of the
corpus delicti, under Code Section 38-420, was reiterated in Grimes v.
State." The corpus delicti (in this case, that a criminal agency was the
cause of the burning of a building) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The evidence was accordingly held to support the conviction below.
Huff v. State" was a prosecution for participating in a lottery known as
the "bolita" game. An instruction that a confession alone, uncorroborated
by any other evidence, would not justify a conviction was held not to be
erroneous, confusing or misleading because of failure to give any rule to
test the degree of corroboration, or that the jury were the judges of the
sufficiency of the corroboration.
CHARACTER

The situation in which proof of the commission of a former crime by
an accused may properly be received against him, notwithstanding its prejudicial effect, was illustrated in Biegun v. State.' The charge was murder
by commission of an unlawful abortion. Evidence that thirteen months
earlier the defendant, under similar circumstances, performed an abortion
on another woman was held admissible to show a plan or scheme, and also
the identity of the parties as to the crime alleged, and was held not too
remote in point of time. Though evidence of one crime is not admissible
on the trial of the defendant for another where the sole purpose is to show
that the defendant was guilty of the former, such evidence is admissible,
said the Supreme Court, to show plan, scheme or identity of parties, where
there is some logical connection between the two transactions, from which
it could be said that proof of one tends to establish the other, or where
evidence of the similar nature of the crime or similar methods employed
shows a reasonable connection in point of time and place between the two.
In Waters v. State 2 there was received into evidence the fact of the defendant's plea of guilty eight years earlier to operating a car while intoxicated. Defendant was thereupon convicted of causing death by driving an auto while intoxicated. The admission of this evidence was held
prejudicial error, since it was too remote and unconnected with the crime
for which the defendant was now being tried, and the conviction was reversed. In Chandler v. State, 3 a prosecution of the defendant for cheating
and swindling by selling a partnership one-third of a used car lot and
fraudulently representing that he was selling a three-year lease on the lot,
evidence was admitted as part of the "same general transaction" that the
defendant had also failed to split with one of the prosecuting witnesses an
agreed amount on the sale of a car. The Court of Appeals held this to be
an improper introduction of the defendant's general character and conduct
in other transactions, which is irrelevant under Code Section 38-202 unless
such character is in issue.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Anderson v. State 4 discusses the situations when evidence regarding the
defendant's character in a criminal case is admissible and when not. It was
a prosecution of a mother for the murder of her child, who, died of malnutrition allegedly as the result of the defendant's criminal neglect. Testimony was admitted that the mother remained out late at night with various men, did not work, entertained men at her house, operated a disorderly
house and returned home frequently late at night with men in various
stages of undress. The court stated that where evidence is admissible to
show motive and to connect the accused with the crime charged, the mere
fact that it may tend to put the character of the defendant in issue does
not render it improper, but where the nature of the case does not involve
such character it is error to allow evidence thereof to go before the jury;
and that it is error to allow, over the defendant's objection, prejudicial and
irrelevant material to go before the jury which tends to place the
defendant's character and conduct before the jury, where the nature of the
case does not involve such character and does not render necessary and
proper the investigation thereof. The Supreme Court accordingly held that
the admission of this evidence as to the defendant in this case was prejudicial error. While the statements of the general rule of law made by the
court are undoubtedly proper, it may be questioned whether their application to the facts in the specific case was correctly made. Did not the evidence in question tend to show directly the defendant's gross neglect of
her*child by failing to be with it and to look after it, and her hardened
indifference to its fate?
Where a defendant's commission of other crimes was disclosed in giving
the details of his apprehension by the police for the crime (murder) for
which he was on trial it was held in McClung v.State, 5 to be no error. The
police officer's testimony was that the defendants were apprehended in a
stolen taxicab in another state and arrested on suspicion of stealing the
cab and robbing the driver. This was held admissible as showing the purpose of the flight, and not error because it incidentally showed the commission of other crimes. The flight of the accused, when and where arrested, the manner of arrest, how the accused was armed, whether he resisted
and all the other circumstances connected with the arrest were ruled proper
evidence to be brought before the jury.
The fact that a written statement made by an accused indicted jointly
with the defendant on trial showed the later commission of a robbery by
the same two individuals of the taxi in which they were apprehended, did
not make the statement inadmissible because it resulted in placing the defendant's character in evidence." It tended to show, said the Supreme
Court, the defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicide and cor.roborated other evidence tending to show robbery as the motive.
The effect to be given to testimony as to an accused's good character was
considered in Johns v. State./ In a burglary prosecution the jury was
charged that it could consider the good character of defendant, not merely
where guilt is doubtful under the testimony, but where the testimony of
74.
75.
76.
77.
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good character may itself generate the doubt, and that such doubt is a positive fact and may justify a reasonable doubt as to guilt, or with other
evidence create doubt upon which the jury should acquit; but that if the
jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,
they should convict notwithstanding evidence as to his general good character. This charge was held proper. The court stated that when the defendant made a statement as to his good character and the court fully and
.correctly charged the jury on the subject of good character, the defendant
could not complain because of a failure to charge expressly that he could
place his general character in issue by his own unsworn statement as well
as by sworn testimony given on his behalf. The case thus illustrates the
right of a defendant to place before the jury his claimed general good
character by means of his own unsworn statement, so as to justify the
jurors in considering it in their deliberations.
Johnson v. Usher 8 was an action to enjoin the use of certain premises,
and for their abatement as a common nuisance, because used for dealing in
liquor. The admission of testimony that the defendant's premises had a
bad reputation for dealing in liquor was held proper; so also was a police
officer's testimony that he raided the premises a few days before the action
was instituted and found whiskey and wine in the garage of the premises;
so also were four accusations charging the defendant with selling liquor,
as showing the continuity of his conduct.
Carrigan v. State,79 a murder prosecution, was a sordid tale indeed.
Among other things, a state witness was permitted to testify as to an
assault and battery and attempted rape committed on her by the defendant
in the deceased's presence several months before the homicide. The denial
of the defendant's motion for a mistrial because such testimony put the
defendant's general character in issue was held not to be error, however,
because the defendant, in an extrajudicial statement which was admitted
without objection, and in his statement to the jury, related the particular
altercation in detail. So also, evidence that the defendant on the day of his
arrest stated that he was driving a stolen car on the day of the homicide
was, over the objection thatit put his character in evidence, held admissible
to rebut his statement to the jury that he owned the car, and to illustrate
his conduct and motive.
In Hayes v. State," a liquor prosecution, the Court of Appeals held that
a mistrial was not required because of a witness's voluntary answer regarding another liquor offense by the defendant, where the court immediately
ruled out the evidence, although he failed to charge the jury to disregard
it, no such charge being expressly requested. Moore v. State" was a murder
prosecution in which the defendant contended to the jury that the deceased's wife, and not the defendant, had killed the deceased. Evidence
that the deceased, some time prior to the killing, stated that his wife was
"a mean woman and a terrible woman, and he would hate to get in any
difficulty with her because that woman will kill you" was refused admission.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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The Supreme Court held this ruling proper. It was "merely an opinion of
her character as to violence," made at an uncertain time before the killing,
and of no probative value; in substance, it was not relevant or material.
CONDITION-STATE OF MIND

Waters v. State2 was a prosecution for causing death by driving an
automobile while intoxicated. Evidence was admitted that the defendant
was drunk when arrested six hours after the collision. This was held not
erroneous, the court saying that it did not appear that the testimony was
harmful and prejudicial. The soundness of this conclusion may be seriously
questioned. Defendant may well have got himself drunk after the accident
because of the emotional state which it had caused. Drunkenness at the time
of the accident was an element essential to his guilt; this evidence did not
establish that element, yet the jury did convict him. Fortunately for the
outcome of the case, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on another ground, namely, that the admission into evidence of the
defendant's plea of guilty years earlier to operating an automobile while
intoxicated constituted prejudicial error.
3 a deed was attacked in an ejectment action on
In Pantone v, Pantone"
the ground that the grantor lacked mental capacity when he executed the
deed. Although the issue was the condition of the grantor's mind at the
time of execution, it was held permissible to receive evidence as to its
condition for a reasonable period of time both before and after the transaction. In Brock v. State,8" a murder prosecution, it was held that the
alleged insanity of the defendant at the time the crime was committed
might be shown by proof of insanity before or after the crime was committed, under circumstances where it may be found from such proof that
the insanity existed at the time of the commission as well.
PAROL EVIDENCE

There were a number of cases involving the parol evidence rule and
illustrating its application in particular situations.
In McKee v. Cartledge85 there was a provision in a contract that a house
under construction was to be "completed in full" by the vendor. The provision was held to be ambiguous, so that parol evidence was admissible
under Code Section 20-704(I) to show that the vendor had agreed to
furnish and install an electric water heater, pump, etc. In Davis v. Hunter
& Co." an indorsement was made on a promissory note given by one who
claimed to have become a partner to another, that the money was to be
used "in & a per cent share" in a named firm. This was held to indicate
that the contract between the parties was partly in writing and partly oral,
so that under Code Section 38-504 all evidence, whether oral or written,
was admissible which tended to show what the contract was in its entirety.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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In Woford v. Waldrip" the maker was held entitled to establish by parol
evidence that he had signed promissory notes as a surety though he appeared thereon as a principal.
Findlay v. Downing Motors, Inc.88 was an action for breach of warranty
in the sale of an automobile, where alleged oral warranties were made
before the consummation of the sale, but the contract or bill of sale later
executed merely stated that the car was sold "as is." It was held that evidence as to the alleged oral warranties would violate the parol evidence
rule and could not be permitted. A general demurrer to the petition had
been sustained; and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Taylor v. Dunaway"9
was an unusual case in which a lessor was suing lessees to recover back the
cost of remodeling the demised premises which the lessor had, under the
written lease provisions, advanced to the lessees. The lessees had not completed their term. The lessor alleged that the lessees had orally agreed to
repay the lessor for the cost of such remodeling. A general demurrer to the
petition had been sustained. The Court of Appeals held that in the absence
of allegations of accident, fraud, mistake or duress, such an oral agreement could not be shown to vary the terms of the written lease, and it
affirmed. A similar holding with respect to a demurrer to an affidavit of
illegality in an action to foreclose a written conditional sales contract which
appeared to be complete and valid on its face is found in Coin Machine
Acceptance Corp. v. Folsom.9 Evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral
agreements was held inadmissible to vary it.
Touchston v. Louis Friedlander& Sons, Inc." involved a lease from the
defendant to the plaintiff of the "north half" of a building which had a
petition running down its center from east to west. On the north side of
the building there was an office occupied by a third person. Defendant collected rental from the third person for said office, and the plaintiff sued to
recover this rental in an action for money had and received. Plaintiff won.
Parol evidence seeking to vary the clear and unambiguous terms of the
lease contract, by showing an alleged oral agreement that the office was
included in the lease, was held properly excluded. 2
Carroll v. Jones93 was an action for specific performance of a contract
to convey realty, in the form of an option provision in a lease that the
lessees should have the right to purchase at a price not to exceed $8,0oo,
but to be determined by appraisal to be made by representatives of the Real
Estate Board. Such appraisal was obtained by the lessees, but the lessor
refused to convey at that price, and sought to bar parol evidence as to the
price and to have the option held void for uncertainty. The Supreme Court
held that the consideration for the purchase must either be expressly stated
in the writing or else the writing must "furnish a key" by which the purchase price can be ascertained. The latter was effectively done here, the
option was therefore sufficiently definite, and parol evidence could be re87.
88.
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ceived as to the holding of the appraisal and the price fixed thereunder.
The "furnish a key" doctrine was also applied by the Court of Appeals to
the description of demised property in a written lease in Homeyer v. Towler."4 The lease description was all that lot situated at the southeast corner
of the junction of two named roads in a named city and county, including
the filling station and store building abutting on a named road. This was
held sufficient to furnish a key to the land's identification and to permit the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to show its precise boundaries. Another
such case, in the Supreme Court, was Lankford v. Pope.5 To convey title,
said the court, the description in a deed must be sufficiently certain to afford
means of identification, but if premises are so referred to as to indicate the
grantor's intention to convey a particular tract of land, extrinsic evidence
is admissible to show the precise location and boundaries of the tract.
The test of sufficiency of the description is whether it discloses with sufficient certainty the grantor's intention as to the quantity and location of the
land described. Here the deed had stated (after some preliminary identification) "said piece of land designated by stakes, containing one-half acre."
Extrinsic evience as to its location, shape and boundaries was held admissible.
Still another "furnish a key" case was Copeland v. Carpenter." A deed
with a caption of the state and county, and words describing the land as
all. land lying south of a named road in a certain fractional lot, was held
admissible as against the claim that it was insufficient properly to identify
the property. If the descriptive averments of a deed furnish a key by which
the land can be definitely located or identified by the aid of extrinsic evidence, the description is sufficient to pass title, declared the Supreme Court.
The same doctrine was also applied by that case to a will involved therein.
A general description in a will, such as "all of my land" in a certain town
county or state was held sufficient to pass title. It showed what land the
testator intended to devise and made its identification practicable. A copy
of the will was therefore held properly admitted in evidence. So again in
White v. Spahr,"1 7 a deed conveying all the land owned by a named person
at her death and "known as the old William Allison place" was also sustained, and the deed was held admissible, together with parol evidence,
to describe precisely the property referred to.
Cooper v. Vaughn98 reiterated the established doctrine that the parol
evidence rule is a rule of substantive law, and that although parol evidence
may be erroneously admitted without objection, it is without probative
value to vary the terms of a written contract." In that case there was a written equipment lease whereby for an express consideration of $90 per
month, one of the defendants, acting through the other defendant, leased to
the plaintiffs for 12 months certain machinery and equipment for a meat
market and poultry business. The equipment lease expressly provided that
"all agreements between the parties are embodied in this indenture."
94.
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Parol evidence was admitted, without objection, that the defendant had
also agreed, as part of the express consideration, all allow the plaintiffs
to occupy the premises where the machinery and equipment were then
located, falsely representing himself to be the owner of the premises. In
fact, the defendant had only a lease of the premises, and the plaintiffs were
compelled by the owner to move when that lease expired. From a judgment
for the plaintiffs, the defendants appealed. All prior or contemporaneous
parol agreements between the same parties, said the Court of Appeals, are
not necessarily merged into a written contract, and a distinct collateral
oral agreement, not inconsistent with the original one, is not so merged.
Where an independent parol agreement is made as an inducement to the
making of a written contract, the parol agreement may be proved and enforced, though not referred to in the written contract. In this case, however, the evidence showed the written equipment lease for the express consideration of $90 per month, which was the total which the plaintiffs
claimed to be required to pay altogether; such lease was "unmixed with
fraud" as to subject matter; and the evidence did not show that the written
contract was the inducement or consideration for the alleged oral lease
or vice versa, or that the execution of the written contract was contingent
upon something else. The court said that the plaintiffs were therefore
merely arguing "that the written contract does not express all that they
were to get for $9 o , and that it should also express an additional benefit,
to wit, the lease of the premises. Obviously this is nothing more or less
than an attempt to vary the terms of a written contract by parol testimony and can not be done." The judgment was accordingly reversed.
Mays v. Lagenback ' involved an independent oral contract, proof of
which was held not to violate the parol evidence rule. The suit was to enjoin the defendants from competing with the plaintiffs in a tourist cabin
business in the immediate vicinity of realty sold to the plaintiffs. In a former case between the parties"' the Supreme Court had ruled, in reversing
the sustaining of a general demurrer to the petition, that the verbal agreement not to compete was an independent and complete contract within itself "collateral to, independent of and distinct from the written contract."
This ruling became the law of the case. Evidence as to the verbal agreement not to compete was therefore held properly admitted; despite the
objection that a letter submitting the offer to sell had been written prior
to the verbal negotiations. and that the subsequent negotiations were reduced to writing. The evidence sufficiently established, the court held, that
no sale or contract of sale was made on the offer contained in such letter,
and that the verbal agreement not to compete was made after the letter was
written, and as an inducement to procure the sale of the realty.
REAL EVIDENCE -

PHOTOGRAPHS

State' 2

Biegun v.
was a prosecution for a murder caused by an alleged
unlawful abortion, where the persons who performed the autopsy testified
that the foetus and generative organs contained in a glass jar were in sub100.
101.
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stantially the same condition as when removed from the decedent's body.
These were accordingly held admissible to show pregnancy at the time of
the abortion, the nature and kind of injuries inflicted on the decedent's
organs, and the age of the foetus.0 3
04 without proof
A letter was held inadmissible in Manning v. Carroll'
of its genuineness. And such proof was not evident from what appeared on
the letter itself, such as the letter head, contents, etc. No effort being made
to prove the letter's execution or that it was genuine, the Supreme Court
held that it was properly excluded from evidence.
A plat was held admissible in Smith v. Smith.. when a civil engineer
testified that he had made certain surveys of the realty and that the plat,
which he had made, was correct.
In Copeland v. Leathers,'0 a suit to enjoin the continued operation of a
tourist camp for failure to comply with a statutory requirement that guest
registers be kept, showing license numbers and names of vehicles transporting guests to such places and other data, and that such records should be
available at all times for use by any local, state or federal peace or law
enforcement officer, it was held that the registration cards, which had been
obtained by peace officers from the defendant's place of business, and
which failed to comply with said statute, were properly admitted in evidence. They were, of course, the very thing in issue.
Fining v. State'07 was a prosecution for stealing an auto, in which it was
contended that the defendant also later forged a bill of sale to himself.
Three purported signatures of the party who allegedly signed the bill of
sale, all written by the defendant, were admitted for the purpose of comparison with the defendant's bill of sale, to show similarity of the handwriting. This was held proper to enable the jury to determine whether
the signature was genuine. In addition, blank forms of bills of sale which
were found in the defendant's apartment were held admissible, as a circumstance which the jury could consider in determining the accused's guilt or
innocence, and to shed light on the availability of means of carrying out
his criminal enterprise.
It is familiar learning that photographs are admissible, when properly
identified by preliminary proof, as showing an accurate representation of
some relevant object. Like all real evidence, however, photographs frequently lend themselves to abuse. In Bryan v. State,'0 a murder prosecution, a
photograph of the decedent with clothes pulled back, so as to show the
location of his wounds, was admitted over objection that there had already been evidence of their location and that the picture would inflame
the minds of the jurors. The. Supreme Court held its admission proper
That the trial court's discretion would have been better exercised to exclude the picture, however, is strongly evidenced by the use which the
solicitor general made of the photograph in his summation in obtaining a
conviction. He called it a "gruesome picture," and said "It might happen
103.
104.
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to you or any man in this community." What might otherwise be taken
solely for rhetoric can acquire deadly effectiveness when reinforced by the
physical representation in the photographic exhibit. The danger of abuse, or
inflammatory misuse, of such evidence is clearly pointed up by this case.
Unless it materially contributes to establishing matters in issue which
cannot conveniently be established otherwise, such evidence ought to be
excluded.
A proper admission of such a photograph, gruesome though it may have
been, is to be found in Anderson v. State,"9 where a mother was being possecuted for the murder of her child, who died of malnutrition allegedly as
the result of the defendant's criminal neglect. The admission of a photograph of the child's body after its death (and eleven days after admission
to the hospital) was held not erroneous where there was testimony that
the child's emaciated body at the time it was admitted to the hospital was
the same as pictured in the photograph. Where the crime was as unusual,
shocking and abnormal, and hence to the average person as incredible, as
that here charged, the photograph, corroborated by the accompanying
testimony was not an unreasonable (and perhaps was the only satisfactory)
means of clearly establishing the facts. The prejudicial reaction which the
jury might instinctively have against the defendant by reason thereof is in
any case inherent in the very nature of the crime for which she was on trial.
PUBLIC RECORDS

The unhappy instance of a city which failed to establish in evidence its
own ordinance, which the city was asserting by way of defense in a suit
against it, is recorded in City of Dalton v. Cochran.'" The city was sued
for negligence in maintaining its streets whereby the plaintiff, driving a
motorcycle, was hurt when he struck a hole in the pavement. It claimed
that the plaintiff was travelling at a speed exceeding the limit set by the
ordinance, and was therefore himself negligent. An exemplification of the
city's ordinance as to speed limit was sought to be introduced, which merely stated that it was a correct copy of an ordinance "as the same appears
of record in the book of ordinances of the city of Dalton." The exemplification was held inadmissible because it was not accompanied by an adopting resolution, or other like matter, showing that either the ordinance itself, or the book of ordinances, was in fact adopted by the city. The fact
that the city clerk certified that it was an exemplification taken from the
book of ordinances of the city gave it no greater dignity than had the
book itself been introduced. Had this been done, the book would have been
inadmissible unless accompanied by an adopting resolution. The trial court
therefore charged that there was no evidence before the jury as to the
city's speed limit, and this charge was held proper. Plaintiff's judgment
against the city was affirmed.
In Powell v. Hansard"' a certificate by an ordinary was held sufficient
to authenticate a record, as it appeared affirmatively in the certificate that
the ordinary had no clerk and was himself acting as the clerk of his own
109. 206 Ga. 527, 57 S.E.2d 563 (1950).
110. 80 Ga. App. 252, 55 S.E.2d 907 (1949).
111. 206 Ga. 505, 57 S.E.2d 677 (1950).
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court. This was held to be a substantial compliance with the provisions of
Code Sections 24.i-8Oi and 24-1804(11).
BUSINESS RECORDS

The writer feels strongly that Georgia has been too laggard in making
proper statutory provision for the admission into evidence of entries made
in the regular course of business. This is one of the "minimum standarsd
... needed in a practicalway to make our court procedure work in the twentieth century.""... Its adoption was recommended by the American Bar Association in I938,"' and much earlier in the outstanding study of suggested reforms in the law of evidence made under the chairmanship of
Professor Edmund M. Morgan for the Commonwealth Fund and published
in 1927."'
Georgia's antiquated shopbook rule 1 ' is an historical heritage, but one
that is not suited to modern business methods and procedures, to the
crowded calendars of courts and lawyers or to the practical necessities of
business people. As a result, some Georgia decisional law has sought to
give effect to practical, sensible modern considerations in particular cases,
even without the statutory aid which has been so strongly recommended.
These efforts have been spotty and non-systematic, however, and necessarily limited in scope. The result has only been to create much uncertainty, and
to leave the Georgia lawyer often confronted with great difficulties in proving what should be the simplest kind of case, i.e., one evidenced by systematic business records kept in regular course (upon which accountants,
bankers, business men, customers, farmers, workmen will regularly relyindeed, all but lawyers and judges trying a case in the more laggard jurisdictions). The recent appellate decisions on the subject will repay examination; they emphasize, the need for statutory enactment to modernize this
portion of our law of evidence, and of our court procedure.
Ronaele Corp. v. Aero Construction Corp."' is a typical example of the
application of the technical Georgia shopbook rule. Plaintiff's original records were introduced in evidence without objection, and the persons who
kept them gave testimony as to the cost of materials and labor which went
into the construction by the plaintiff of a building for the defendant and
the development of another property for the defendant; also, persons
who had previously dealt with the corporation testified that its records
were usually correct; in addition, the president of the plaintiff corporation
gave testimony as to the cost of said materials and labor. A judgment for
the plaintiff, which depended upon his establishing the cost of said materials
and labor, was appealed from despite this extensive proof. The Supreme
Court held that even if the president's testimony was hearsay, there was
sufficient proper evidence to justify the judgment for the plaintiff under
the Georgia rule. Brackett v. Fulton National Bank ' 7 was an action for
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

VANDERBILT, MINIMUM! STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION p. xxi (1949).
See VANDERBILT, op. Cit. supra note 112.

MORGAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE -SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM, (1927).
GA. CODE § 38-310 (1933).
205 Ga. 424, 53 S.E.2d 920 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 467, 56 S.E.2d 486 (1949).
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money had and received by a bank against its depositor, to recover an
overdraft paid for the depositor. The bank statement showing the amount
of the depositor's overdraft was held admissible, but no authority was
cited on this point.
Haygood v. Smith" 8 was an action to recover the unpaid balance on a
building contract. Plaintiff's books of account and statements therefrom
were held properly admitted where the bookkeeper who made the entries
identified the books and testified that the entries were made from original
bills, memoranda, etc., and that the books were books of original entry
and in her handwriting. This of course departed from the technical requirements of the shopbook rule. The Court of Appeals placed reliance upon
the early forward-looking case of Field Bros. & Co. v. Collier,"9 in which
Justice Lumpkin emphatically ruled admissible the testimony of a bookkeeper and an account sales clerk as to the correctness of entries in account books
which they kept, without need for supporting testimony on the transactions
from the individuals who conducted them, and also ruled admissible in
evidence a transcript from said books, which were themselves held to be
the best evidence. His notable opinion reads in part:
"Plaintiffs offered in evidence the depositions of Edward Hogland and John
Clancy, to prove the sale of the cotton, the expenses incurred, etc. And counsel
for the defendant objected, because the witnesses stated, "that they ... derived
their information relative to the matter about which they swore from the books,
documents, accounts and vouchers, of plaintiffs.
"Edward Hogland was bookkeeper, and John Clancy account sales clerk, of
this large factorage and commission house in Liverpool. They both testify to
the correctness of the account of sales and expenses upon the defendant's lot

of cotton...

"Shall this proof be received, or shall the plaintiffs be compelled to go behind
the books thus verified by the clerks who kept them, and resort to each of the
sub-agents who participated in the transaction and sale of this produce? Are
not the entries thus made in the usual course of the business of this extensive
trading establishment, and as a part of the proper employment of the witnesses who prove them, not only the best, but the only reliable evidence which
it is practicable to procure? We have no hesitation in holding that propriety,
justice and convenience, require .it to be admitted. The weighers, wharfingers,
and numerous subordinates who handled this cotton, keep no books. They report
to the clerks who keep the books of the concern, and their functions are performed. It is not reasonable to suppose that they can remember the multitude
of transactions thus occurring every day. After the lapse of a very brief period,
the clerks themselves could only call to mind what had been done, by referring
to their entries and memoranda. How could these sub-agents be expected to do
so, without such means of refreshing their memory?
"The actual salesmen in none of the great wholesale stores, keep the books.
They report to the clerks who stand at the different desks, and they make the
entries. And yet, these books are always received to prove the sale and delivery
of goods. Any other rule would invol' e enormous expense, as well as inconvenience, and would in the end be productive of no practical benefit.
"To impose a different rule upon these estabsishments, whether at home or
abroad, and to require them at all times within the statutory period of limitations, to be prepared with original aliunde evidence, to prove the terms of sale
of all the property consigned to them, each item of expense etc., would trammel
commerce, and amount to a denial of justice.
"If we are right in the view which we take of the books, namely, that they
are the best evidence in the power of the plaintiff to produce, then it follows,
120
of course, that the transcript from the books should have been admitted."
118. 80 Ga. App. 461, 56 S.E.2d 310 (1949).
119. 13 Ga. 496 (1853).
120. Id. at 498-501 (1853).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

Chambers v. Williams Bros. Lumber Co.'' was a most interesting case.
A lumber company sued a building contractor and the building's owner to
recover for lumber furnished to erect the building, and also to establish a
special lien on the building for the price of the lumber. Ledger sheets taken
from the book of original entry of the lumber compnay were held admissible in evidence, even though detached, when identified by the oath of its
secretary-treasurer that they were made by the person whose duty it was
to record the entries therein in the regular cours of business, and that
the keeping of the books was done under the secretary-treasurer's supervision. Although the Court of Appeals cited Code Section 38-310, which
states the technical requirements of the Georgia shopbook rule, it emphasized the second requirement of that section, i.e., that the book tendered
be the book of original entries, and evidently disregarded various other requirements thereof. As the testifying secretary-treasurer did not have personal knowledge of the sales and purchases, this case seems to approach a
working "regular business entry" rule. The necessity for making such regular business records admissible was thus stated by the Court of Appeals:
"The reason for the rule embodied in the foregoing quoted Code section making the books of original entry of the creditor admissible for the purpose of
proving accounts, as disclosed by the history of litigation involving this question, beginning before the adopticn of the Code section is that in the course of
business, books of account are kept because human mental capacity is inadequate to retain the memory of each of such transactions. It follows that where
the books conform to the provisions of the Code section, they themselves stand
as a witness of the correctness of the account and make a prima facie case
which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant debtor to show the items
contained in the books, or some of them, are not correct. In view of the great
volume of business done by thousands of business establishments throughout
the State and country in the present day and age, if the rule were
otherwise, it
122
would be impossible for business firms to prove their accounts."'

Nevertheless, the case did not go far enough, for it held that the books
made a prima facie case only against the actual purchaser (i.e., the building
contractor), and were not admissible against the owner for whom the contractor was erecting the building. The presumed authenticity and correctness of the ledger sheets, and the practical reasons for receiving them in
evidence, were in no way affected by any reasonable distinction which could
be drawn between the contractor and the owner. Only the technicalities inherent in the confused and unsatisfactory condition of Georgia law on this
subject caused a distinction to be made between the two. Thus, the salutary
objective of the court was not fully realized because of the unjustifiable
distinction which it felt itself compelled to make under existing Georgia law.
Taylor v. Young'23 was an action to recover possession of real property.
Plaintiff's husband, who was also the defendant's son, testified by deposition that a book which showed entries as expenditures for labor and supplies was a record which he kept, or had his daughter-in-law keep, of money
he had spent on the property, including the reimbursement of the defendant for money which she expended thereon, and that he had examined the
entries and found them to be correct. The book was admitted in evidence
121. 80 Ga. App. 38, 55 S.E.2d 244 (1949).
122. Id. at 42, 55 S.E.2d at 248 (1949).
123. 81 Ga. App. 391, 58 S.E.2d 923 (1950).
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for the purpose of contradicting evidence to the effect that the defendant
had made valuable improvements on the property under an alleged contract giving her a life estate therein. Its admission was held proper by
the Court of Appeals, which said:
• ... The manner in which the documentary evidence was identified by C. 0.
Young gave it the effect of making it his own direct testimony as to expenditures actually made by him, or of which he had direct knowledge, and under
such circumstances it was tantamount to the best evidence of the expenditures,
and a showing that the book was admissible under the provisions of Code, §
38-310 was unnecessary. It was not error to admit the book in evidence. See
Villa Rica Manufacturing Co. v. General American Life Ins. Co., 55 Ga. App.
328 (2), 190 S.E. 49; Booth v. Sclvnoller & Mueller Piano Co., 32 Ga. App.
v. V. Hammond & Sons, 13 Ga. App. 238 (3),
35 (3), 122 S.E. 636; Harper
12
79 S.E. 44, and citations."'

In Rymer v. Fidelity & Fire Corp.,2 an action against an insurance com..pany for the loss of an automobile, testimony was admitted, which was given by an employee of an automobile manufacturer from the manufacturer's records which were before him, over the objection that the testimony
was from a record which was itself the best evidence of its contents. His
testimony, which had been taken by deposition, showed that the records
were "kept in the usual course of business," and that he was the manufacturer's resident comptroller, and as such had charge thereof. Its admission
was held proper, and it was treated as an expert's interpretation of complicated books, and the giving of his personal knowledge in evidence as refreshed by such books.
It is to be hoped that Georgia will soon remedy the shortcomings and
uncertainties of its law in this important field by appropriate legislation.
In another aspect of the matter of business records and their use in evidence, Georgia has taken a forward step in making §tatutory provision for
the admissibility of photostatic, microphotographic or other photographic
reproductions in lieu of the originals. A i95o statute126 provides:
"That any photostatic, micro-photographic or photographic reproduction of
any original writing or record which may be or has been made in the regular
course of business to preserve permanently by such reproduction the writing
or record shall be admissible in evidence in any proceeding in any court of this
State, and in any proceeding before any Board, Bureau, Department, Commission or Agency of the State, in lieu of and without accounting for the original
of such writing or record. Any enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction
shall likewise be admissible if the original of such reproduction is in existence
and available for inspection under direction of the court or the agency conducting the proceeding."
CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE

State2

the defendant was convicted of possessing illegal
In Williams v.
whiskey. Alleged newly discovered evidence offered as the basis for a new
trial was only cumulative and impeaching, even though the witness sought
so to be impeached was the only witness against the defendant on a vital
point. It was held that the trial judge's discretion in not allowing a new
trial would not be disturbed.
124. Id. at 391, 58 S.E.2d 924 (1950).
125. 81 Ga. App. 308, 58 S.E.2d 471 (1950).
126. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 73.
127. 80 Ga. App. 638, 56 S.E.2d 922 (1949).
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

That a criminal conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence was
held by the Supreme Court in McClung v. State.'28
The essential requirements for satisfactory circumstantial evidence were
expounded in Sixth Street Corp. v. Daniel."' A fire had been caused by
a defect in the motor of an electric refrigerator furnished by a landlord to
his tenant, and repaired by the landlord; the tenant recovered for the damage done to his property. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that
where a party having the burden of proof on an issue relies on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances relied on must tend in some proximate degree to establish the conclusion sought to be established, and must not only
be consistent with such conclusion but also inconsistent with every other
reasonable hypothesis.
Facts which are consistent with either of two theories, said the Court
of Appeals in Chevrolet-Atlanta Division v. Nash,"' prove neither theory,
generally speaking. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company v. Bridges'3'
was a workmen's compensation case, in which the Court of Appeals ruled
that inferences may be based on facts whose determination is the result of
other inferences, so long as the first inference is based upon such evidence
as to be regarded as a proved fact and the conclusion reached is not too
remote. In 4llood v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp."' there was circumstantial
evidence that the individual defendant, a truck driver, might have been the
employee of the corporate defendant acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the collision, and there was also direct and unimpeached
evidence to the contrary which was introduced by the corporate defendant.
The circumstantial evidence might also, however, have been taken as consistent with the direct, unimpeached evidence. In this situation, the circumstantial evidence was of no probative value, declared the Court of Appeals, and its exclusion was not harmful error. A directed verdict for the
corporate defendant was held proper.
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

The guest registration cards which operators of tourist camps are required to keep were held, in Copeland v. Leathers, 3" ' not to have been illegally obtained from the camp operators when they were produced and
delivered upon request of two members of a grand jury and a policemen,
since the statute requires them to be available at all times for inspection
by any local, county, state or federal police or law enforcement officer.
A very strong statement of the Georgia doctrine which admits evidence
illegally obtained is to be found in Winston v. State,"' where the Court
of Appeals held that although such evidence may be obtained by the police
in an "unlawful, unwarranted, unreasonable and reprehensible" search of
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

206 Ga. 421, 57 S.E.2d 559
80 Ga. App. 680, 57 S.E.2d
81 Ga. App. 671, 59 S.E.2d
81 Ga. App. 395, 58 S.E.2d
81 Ga. App. 189, 58 S.E.2d
206 Ga. 280, 56 S.E.2d 530
79 Ga. App. 711, 54 S.E.2d

(1950).
210 (1950).
681 (1950).
849 (1950).
522 (1950).
(1949). See also at p. 106 under REAL EVIDENCE.
354 (1949).
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a defendant's home, in the course of "a flagrant violation" of the Federal
and Georgia Constitutions, this does not affect the admissibility against
the defendant of the evidence so obtained. The court added that as long
as a defendant is not required himself to produce such evidence, even its
forcible taking from his home without his consent does not make its subsequent use against him the equivalent of compelling him to testify against
himself.
C ROss-EXAMI NATION

A few cases"' reiterated the well-established doctrine that the latitude
to be permitted upon cross-examination rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court, and that an appellate court will not interfere unless such discretion has been abused. In Caldwell v. Brown'3 may be found, the writer
submits, an instance of a too generous application of this doctrine, where
improper prejudice resulted. A female pedistrian who was struck and injured by an automobile, sued for damages. Defendant contended that the
plaintiff was intoxicated when struck. The trial court permitted a line of
questioning relating to the location of liquor stores along the route which
the plaintiff had followed before the accident. The Court of Appeals held
that this was not obviously unfair, the questions apparently having been
asked in the hope of eliciting some admission from the plaintiff. Was not
such questioning plainly prejudicial, however. It surely did not bear upon
the actuality of the plaintiff's alleged intoxication. Yet the repetition of
questions of the kind asked could readily, without justification and by mere
innuendo, convey the impression that the defendant's assertion was true. Of
a woman, particularly, such questioning was calculated to give an unfavorable association to her side of the case in the minds of some of the jurors.
If the defendant had any actual evidence to submit that the plaintiff had
been visiting various liquor stores in the course of her walk before the accident and imbibing, the situation would have been different; but in that
case such direct evidence would have been offered, and the unfair and improper innuendo technique would not have been employed.
In Owens v. State,' 3 a robbery prosecution, the court refused to permit
the defendant's counsel to cross-examine a prosecuting witness as to the
location of the home of a girl friend upon whom he called before the
robbery, to show that she lived in a disreputable neighborhood, and thus
reflect on his credibility. This refusal, said the Court of Appeals, was er.
roneous, but harmless to the defendant because the prosecution witness',
testimony was corroborated by that of a police officer and other witnesses.
Pan-iinericanWall Paper & Paint Co. v. Tudor'38 was an action on ar

open account where the defendant contended that all his dealings were
with a former manager of the plaintiff who had been discharged for stealing
the plaintiff's bank deposit, and that all the defendant's payments were
made directly to said manager. It was held that the court properly per.
Carroll v. Hill, 80 Ga. App. 576, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949); Western & Atlantic Ry. v,
Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E.2d 357 (1949) ; Caldwell v. Brown, 80 Ga. App
858, 57 S.E.2d 618 (1950).
136. 80 Ga. App. 858, 57 S.E.2d 618 (1950).
137. 81 Ga. App. 182, 58 S.E.2d 550 (1950).
138. 81 Ga. App. 417, 59 S.E.2d 12 (1950).
135.
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mitted the defendant to show, on cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness, that such dishonesty was the reason for the former manager's discharge. The cross-examination of an adverse witness, declared the Court
of Appeals, should be broadly allowed in a thorough and sifting fashion;
the feelings or bias of a witness as to the subject matter of the controversy
or as to any party involved are always a ligitimate subject of inquiry.
OBJECTIONS -

EXCEPTIONS

An examination of the cases under this topic illustrates shortcomings in
the techniques of many trial lawyers, and furnishes valuable lessons for
self-improvement.
Where evidence is objected to in its entirety, the Supreme Court held in
Ricks v. State,' 9 and any portion is not subject to the objection, it is not
error to admif the entire evidence over such objection. In the same case, it
was also held that where evidence is objected to and admitted, though improperly, if during the trial the substance of the same evidence is admitted
without objection, the overruling of the original objection will not be cause
for a new trial. 4 °
An absurd situation of the same kind may be found in Fining v. State. 4'
There the state had asked a witness for the defendant on cross-examination
whether he knew that the defendant had previously been convicted of
motor theft in another city, and the witness had said no. The Court of Appeals considered the question to be "highly improper." Defendant himself,
however, in his Own statement, later undertook to make a detailed explanation to the jury concerning his former conviction. The admission of the
defendant's ill-advised statement was held to have rendered harmless the
previous error, and the conviction was affirmed.
The converse of this proposition has also been reiterated by the courts.
In Wofford v. Waldrip'4' it was held that the improper rejection of evidence
is not reversible error when other evidence of the same import is admitted without objection.'
Where no objection was made to the admission of improper testimony,
it was, of course, held that no question for determination on review was
presented.' In Carroll v. Hill, 4 "We object to that" was held to be too
general in form and to raise no question for review. Chambers v. Williams
Bros. Lumber Co.' involved evidence erroneously admitted over objection, but no exceptions were preserved to its admission. The petition could
have been amended to conform to the proof so that the evidence would be
admissible and would have supported substantially the same cause of action. The exception that there was a fatal variance between pleading and
proof was held to be without merit. In another case, Smith v. Smith,""
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

206 Ga. 20, 55 S.E.2d 576 (1949).
See also Waller v. State, 80 Ga. App. 488, 56 S.E.2d 491 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 756, 57 S.E.2d 354 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 562, 56 S.E.2d 816 (1949).
See also Smith v. State, 79 Ga. App. 595, 54 S.E.2d 378 (1949).
Williams v. State, 206 Ga. 107, 55 S.E.2d 589 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 576, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 38, 55 S.E.2d 244 (1949). See also at p. 110 supra under BUSINESS
REcoRDs.

147. 206 Ga. 461, 57 S.E.2d 611 (1950).
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where the defendants took no direct exceptions at the proper time that
the judgment did not follow and was not authorized by the verdict, or was
not authorized by the pleadings, their motion for a new trial was held properly denied.
An interesting case on courtroom tactics and deportment of counsel
is that of Caldwell v. Brown.'4 8 An objection not insisted upon, declared
the Court of Appeals, will be deemed abondoned. A mere criticism of remarks of opposing counsel, not couched as an objection, is insufficient to invoke any ruling by the court; and an assignment of error is not meritorious
when the result thereof was beneficial to the complaining party. The case
is especially noteworthy, however, in connection with the handling of interruptions and interpolations by opposing counsel of facts not in evidence.
Defendant's counsel apparently did this a number of times within the hearing of the jury. Plaintiff lost the case, and contended in the appellate court
"that she was thereby deprived, in many instances, of her right to a fair
cross-examination, that her counsel were embarrassed and handicapped,
the jury's mind poisoned, and the solemnity of the trial itself burlesqued
and destroyed by the conduct of opposing counsel and the failure of the
trial court to properly reprimand or restrain them." The appellate court
said, "It is apparent that most, if not all, of the remarks of counsel above
quoted were improper and objectionable." In one instance, at the request
of the plaintiff's counsel, the court commenced to admonish counsel for the
defendant, but when the defendant's counsel interrupted, the plaintiff's
counsel did not wait for the court to finish, and proceeded with his questioning of the witness. In another instance, while the plaintiff's counsel stated
to the court that the side remarks of opposing counsel were improper, he
did not make a clear-cut, formal objection or motion for a mistrial. The
result was that the plaintiff was held to have been properly denied a new
trial despite these conceded improprieties on the part of the defendant's
counsel. When proper objection is made to such interruptions and interpolations by opposing counsel of facts not in evidence, the appellate court
held, it may review the rulings of the trial court on such objections to determine whether or not such affirmative action was taken as to eradicate the
prejudicial effect of such remarks from the minds of the jury. Under the
circumstances here, however, the trial court's action in cautioning the jury
to consider only the evidence in the case and not the remarks of counsel
to one another and to the court, was deemed sufficient to correct the situation. The opinion contains a number of quotations and citations which will
repay study. Perhaps the following excerpt should be included here:
"Much has been written in our law concerning the conduct required on the
trial of a case, and a review of former rulings emphasizes the scrupulousness
with which the courts enforce their precepts in this regard. In Berry v. State,
10 Ga. 511, at page 522, the court held, 'That the practice complained of is
highly reprehensible, no one can doubt. It ought in every instance to be promptly repressed. For counsel to undertake, by a side wind, to get that in as proof
which is merely conjecture, and thus to work a prejudice in the mind of the
jury, cannot be tolerated .. .Let nothing tempt them to pervert the testimony,
or surreptitiously array before the jury facts which, whether true or not, have
not been proven.' In Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, Judge Nisbet said further,
'The rule is, that it is contrary to law for counsel to comment upon facts not
148. 80 Ga. App. 858, 57 S.E.2d 618 (1950). See also at p. 113 supra under CRoss-ExAMINATION.
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proven. He represents his client-he is the substitute of his client; whatever
the client may do in the conduct of his cause, therefore, his counsel may do.
in relation to his liberty of speech, the largest and most liberal freedom is
allowed, and the law protects him in it. The right of discussing the merits of
his cause, both as to the law and the facts, is indispensable to every party;
the same right appertains to his counsel. The range of discussion is widevery wide . . . [but] statements of facts not proven, and comments thereon,
are outside of a cause; they stand legally irrevelant to the matter in question,
and are-therefore not pertinent. If not pertinent, they are not within the
privilege of counsel.' In Fair v. State, 168 Ga. 409, 148 S.E. 144, 145, the
court quotes Mr. Justice Lumpkin's opinion in Washington v. State, 87 Ga. 12,
13 S.E. 131, as follows: 'It is the well-settled policy of this court that counsel
in the argument of cases should confine their remarks to the law and the evidence, and that in no instance should they be permitted to comment upon extraneous "acts prejudicial to the interests or rights of a party, over his objection, unless such facts be of a kind of which judicial cognizance may be
taken without proof.' 'An advocate . . . ought not to be allowed to make

himself a witness, and state facts within his own knowledge touching the case
under discussion.' Weeks on Attcrneys at Law (2d Ed.), 243. 'What the law
forbids is the introduction into a case, by way of argument, of facts not in
the record, and calculated to prejudice the accused.' Taylor v. State, 121 Ga.
348, 354, 49 S.E. 303 (306). Flights of oratory and false logic do not call for
objections, rebukes, or mistrials. It is the introduction of facts not in evidence
that requires the application of such remedies. Patterson v. State, 124 Ga. 408,
(409), 52 S.E. 534; Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 523,' Brooks v. State, 55 Ga.
App. 227, at page 232, 189 S.E. 852, at page 855."' "'
BURDEN OF PROOF

In Bailey v. Insurance Co. of North America, 's a bailor's action for dam-

age to a rented airplane, it was ruled that the bailor had the burden of
proof, but that he made out a prima facie case of negligence by showing that
the property was delivered to the bailee and later returned in a damaged
condition or not returned at all. The bailee must then go forward with
evidence to negative his negligence.

Jones v. Smith'5 ' was a suit to cancel an option to purchase realty, and
it was contended that the optionor was incompetent when he executed the
option. The court stated that the burden was on the party attacking a contract to show the incompet*ency of the signer at the time of its execution.
In Carroll v. Hill,' 2 an application by a widow for a year's support, the

caveators alleged the invalidity of her ceremonial marriage with the decedent. The burden of proving that the widow's prior marriages to others
had not been lawfully terminated was properly held to rest on the caveators.
Barnes v. Bell.. 3 was a suit for specific performance of an alleged oral

gift of land. The trial court's charge was held proper in requiring the plaintiff to establish the parol contract to a 'moral and reasonable certainty and
beyond a reasonable doubt, by clear, strong and satisfactory evidence, the
general rule of preponderance of evidence having also been charged as to
the other issues.
4 a verdict
In Minor v. Fincher'"
was directed for the plaintiff in a suit
for reformation of the description in a deed, on the ground of mutual
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 860-861, 57 S.E.2d at 620-621 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 521, 56 S.E.2d 848 (1949).
206 Ga. 162, 56 S.E.2d 462 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 576, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949).
206 Ga. 660, 58 S.E.2d 400 (1950).
206 Ga. 721, 58 S.E.2d 389 (1950).
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mistake. This was held error in the absence of clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence as to the nature of the contract between the grantor and
,.the grantee, or how the mistake occurred. 5
In Pan-American Wall Paper & Paint Co. v. Tudor"' the failure of the
trial court to charge, in an action on an open account, that the burden of
proof was on the defendant to establish payment, absent a specific written
request to do so, was held not reversible error. In the absence of timely
written request, said the Court of Appeals, it is not error to fail to charge
as to shifts in the burden of proof. Where a special defense is set up denying
a plaintiff's entire case, the burden of proof is still on him, and it is not the
duty of the court, the opinion stated, in the absence of a request, to charge
the jury as to the burden of proving the special defense.
JURY QUESTIONS-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE

The settled doctrine that the weight and credibility to be given to the
testimony of witnesses in cases of conflicting testimony is for the jury was
repeated in Balark v. State."7 In a workmen's compensation case, Chevrolet-Atlanta Division v. Nash,"' such weight and credibility were held to be
for the fact-finding board; where there was some competent testimony in
the record to support the board's fact findings and compensation award,
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were held bound thereby.'59
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haygood,"' another compensation case,
reiterated this principle as applying in the absence of fraud.
The proper location of a line called for by a deed was held a question of
fact for the jury in White v. Spahr."'
In Otwell Motor Co. v. Hill.2 it was held that a jury could not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence that a newly-installed roof leaked and
was defective and would cost a specified amount to put into the condition in
which it should have been. To award the plaintiff the full contract price,
and to disallow the claimed recoupment in the face of such uncontradicted
evidence, was held error.
The mental capacity of a grantor of real property was held to be
properly a jury question in Pantone v. Pantone.6 3 Persons who were present
when the grantor executed the deed testified that he had sufficient mentality
at the time of its execution. A physician, however, testified by deposition
that he examined the grantor 22 days after the deed was executed, that
at said time the grantor was mentally incompetent, and that such mental
incompetence must have existed for at least a month. The Supreme Court
held that under these circumstances the question of the grantor's mental
competence was for the jury. It further stated that though direct and positive testimony given by an unimpeached witness as to the existence of facts
155.
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apparently within his own knowledge, and not itself incredible, impossible or
inherently improbable, cannot be arbitrarily rejected by the trier of the
facts on a mere surmise that perhaps it might not accord with the truth,
yet where such testimony is contradicted by proof of facts which could be
taken as incompatible therewith, the question of which theory will be accepted in a qestion for the trier of the facts.
In a murder prosecution, McClung v. State,".' it was held that mere
presence and participation in the general transaction in which a homicide
is committed is not conclusive evidence of consent and concurrence in the
perpetration of the crime unless the person participates also in the felonious design'of the one who does the actual killing. Further, it was held that
it is not necessary for murder to be an explicit part of the original design,
if it be an incidental, probable consequence of executing that design, and
it appears at the moment to one of the participants to be expedient for
the common purpose. The question of whether the defendant participated
in the felonious design of the one actually killing is, therefore, a jury question, to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of the case. In
Pinkerton v. State... the Court of Appeals ruled that where the State's
evidence authorizes a conviction and the defendant's statement authorizes
acquittal, a verdict of guilty will not be disturbed, because the jury has the
right to disbelieve the defendant's statement in whole or in part.
Questions of negligence and diligence are for the jury, except in clear,
plain and palpable cases, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed in Bailey v. Insurance Co. of North America.6 It was, therefore, held improper for the
trial court to direct a verdict for the plaintiff. The case is interesting factually, involving a suit for damages for the wrecking of a plane because it
ran out of gas while in flight and crashed. The plane had been rented. The
owner claimed that the person flying it was negligent in not carrying sufficient gas for a safe flight to its destination. The flier claimed that the plane
was mechanically defective, and thus caused the loss and waste of gas out
of a quantity which was originally adequate for the flight.
In Partainv. King,"7 a dispossessory proceeding, the defendant testified
that although he was able to read, he had signed without reading a documetn by the terms of which the premises in question were leased to him by
the plaintiff. Defendant had never surrendered possession to the landlord,
but had, after the date of the lease, rented the premises to his codefendants. Since a tenant is not allowed to dispute his landlord's title without
first surrendering possession, a verdict for the plaintiff was demanded, although the defendant testified elsewhere that the written lease was not
filled out to cover the land in dispute when he signed it. The contradictory
testimony of a party in his own behalf, sad the Supreme Court, will be
construed most strongly against him, and he is not entitled to a finding
in his favor if that version of his testimony most unfavorable to him shows
that the verdict should be against him. In Sixth Street Corp. v. Daniel,6 '
a fire was caused by a defect in the motor of an electric refrigerator fur164.
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168.
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nished by the landlord to the tenant and repaired by the landlord. The
tenant recovered for the damage to his property in the fire. In affirming,
the Court of Appeals ruled that where proven circumstances of real and
actual probative value caused the jury to find that the preponderence of
evidence is in favor of the hypothesis claimed as against all other reasonable but less probable theories, all such theories are excluded, and the evidence, though circumstantial, is sufficient to support the jury's finding.
SUMMATION

The Court of Appeals, in Johns v. State,"9 held that where there was no
evidence to support the prosecution's argument that witnesses had been
summoned by the defendant to testify to his good character, and the jury
could have inferred from the argument that such witnesses were not used
because their testimony would be unfavorable to the defendant's character,
the overruling of the defendant's
objection to that portion of the summa7
tion was reversible error. 1
In Biegun v. State'7 the court had in its charge fully defined direct and
circumstantial evidence and instructed the jury under what circumstances
they would be authorized to convict on circumstantial evidence alone. It
was therefore held not error to refuse a requested charge that the case
was one of circumstantial evidence. In Steed v. State,7 2 where the evidence
in a bastardy proceeding was wholly circumstantial, it was held that the
failure of the court to charge the principles of law regarding circumstantial
evidence constituted reversal erroraeven when no request for such a charge
was made. On the other hand, in Smith v. State,17 a timely request for a
charge on the statute regarding the impeachment of witnesses was held
essential, and it was not reversible error, even in a murder trial, for the
court to fail to give such charge in the absence of a request."1'
A charge on the subject of flight was authorized in a murder trial when
the evidence, including the defendant's statement, showed that the defendant left the scene of the killing and remained away from home the
afternoon and night following, and that during his absence officers searched
the area for some miles around his home but were unable to locate him."'
Fields v. Yellow Cab Co.7' holds that it is not erroneous for a court to
refuse to charge the statutory presumption under Code Section 38-I 19 as
to non-production of evidence or superior evidence in a party's power when
the record shows that either party could have produced the witnesses in
question.
The failure of the trial court to charge that the burden of proof was
on the defendant to establish a defense of payment in an action on an
open account was held, in Pan-American Wall Paper & Paint Co. v. Tu169. 79 Ga. App. 429, 54 S.E.2d 142 (1949).
170. See also, as to improper summation, the discussion of CaldweUt v. Broum, 80 Ga.
App. 858, 57 S.E.2d 618 (1950), at p. 115 supra. Under OBJECTIONs-ExcEPTIONS.
171. 206 Ga. 618, 58 S.E.2d 149 (1950).
172. 80 Ga. App. 360, 56 S.E.2d 149 (1949).
173. 79 Ga. App. 595, 54 S.E.2d 378 (1949).
174. Citing GA. CODE §§ 38-1803, 81-1101 (1933).
175. McBurnett v. State, 206 Ga. 59, 55 S.E.2d 598 (1949).
176. 80 Ga. App. 569, 56 S.E.2d 845 (1949).
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dor,1" not to be rerersible error, since there was no specific, timely, written request for such a charge. The court said that it was not error to fail
to charge as to shifts in the burden of proof unless so requested. In Huff v.
State"8 it was held that a charge that a confession alone, uncorroborated
by any other evidence, did not justify a conviction, was not erroneous, misleading or confusing in failing to give any rule to test the degree of corroboration, oir that the jury were judges of the sufficiency of the corroboration.
If additional instructions were desired, said the court, a timely and proper
request therefor should have been made. 7 '
In Balark v. State' a refusal to charge a written request properly adjusted to 'the evidence was held not to be error when the matter contained
therein was sufficiently covered by the general charge. It is not necessary,
said the court, even when requested, to point out specific evidence offered
by the defendant and to charge the jury particularly to consider it, when
the jury has already been charged generally to consider all the evidence
and base their verdict thereon. Grady County v. Banker' involved a slip
of the tongue whereby the court said "defendants" instead of "plaintiff"
in charging, in a negligence case, that the damages should be reduced in
proportion to the degree of negligence attributable to the plaintiff. The
court said that this verbal inaccuracy was a palpable slip of the tongue,
which clearly could not have misled the jury. In any case, the court pointed
out, the result in this particular context would be the same as if the charge
had been correctly put. In the same case, too, it was held not an error warranting the reversal of a verdict for the plaintiff that the court failed to
charge that he could not recover unlessathe defendant county knew of the
defective condition of a temporary bridge or that such defect had existed
for so long that the defendant's knowledge thereof would be presumed,
when the evidence was such that it demanded a finding of actual knowlege
of the condition. Again, although counties are not insurers of the safety of
persons using county bridges, no error was found in the court's failure so
to charge in the absence of a request therefor. And lastly, the court held,
it is never error to refuse to direct a verdict. 8 '
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

A great many decisions involved asserted insufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict or findings. In most cases, additional specific errors were
urged for reversal. Often the specific errors urged were obviously the core
of the appeal, and the general ground of insufficiency was thrown in as
a precaution and for good measure. In many cases this general ground constituted the appellant's principal hope for reversal, and the specific
alleged errors were carried for ballast. It is clear from the results, however, that the general ground of insufficiency of the evidence proved to
be of little value to plaintiffs in error, in either civil or criminal cases.
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Appellate courts do not desire to substitute their judgment for that of
the triers of the facts, and there will be finding almost by rote, in the great
mass of cases, that the evidence was sufficient. No attempt will be made
to list the many cases which so held, but representative ones are given in
o
the footnote.'
In one case, Mitchell v. State,' involving a conviction of assault and
battery, the defendant almost succeeded. He had persualed one-half of the
entire Court of Appeals to reverse, but then the Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction.
More successful was one of the four defendants in Balark v. State,'
as to whom the evidence was found insufficient to sustain his conviction, although it was held sufficient as to the other three. Also, in Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Haygood,186 a workmen's compensation case, the employer
and insurance carrier succeeded in persuading the Court of Appeals that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding of total dependency, and
required a finding of only partial dependency instead. The case has its
irony, however. The director had originally made a finding of only partial
dependency, but -the employer and insurance carrier had appealed to the
full board. On such appeal, the board had found total dependency and increased the award accordingly, and the superior court had affirmed the
award based on total dependency. Thus, the success of the employer and
insurance carrier in the Court of Appeals on the question of sufficiency of
evidence merely restored them to their earlier status, with which they had
been so little pleased that they had undertaken. their unfortunate series of
appeals.
To summarize, it is old learning, borne out by the recent decisions, that
if one has no better ground for reversal than alleged general insufficiency
of the evidence to sustain the verdict or findings below,oit will almost surely
prove a waste of time, money and effort on the part of counsel, client and
court to take the case up for review on that ground. "
183. Johnson v. User, 206 Ga. 798, 58 S.E.2d 826 (1950) (injunction against use of
premises for selling liouor); Phn American Wall Paper & Paint Co. v. Tudor,
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title) ; White v. Spahr, 207 Ga. 10, 59 S.E.2d 916 (1950) (action for timber
cutting); Grady County v. Banker, 81 Ga. App. 701, 59 S.E.2d 732 (1950) (negligence); Phelps v. State, 80 Ga. App. 544, 56 S.E.2d 837 (1949) (assault with
intent to rape) ; Owens v. State, 81 Ga. App. 182, 58 S.E.2d 550 (1950) (robbery) ;
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App. 461, 59 S.E.2d 43 (1950) (lottery) ; Ellison v. State, 81 Ga. App. 550, 59
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